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CORPORATIONS - VOTING TRUSTS - POWER OF VOTING TRUSTEE TO
ELECT DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS FOR PERIOD EXTENDING BEYOND TERMINATION OF TRUST - Defendants held all the stock of a corporation as voting
trustees under a voting trust which provided that it should terminate November
18, 1941, and that the trustees should deliver the stock to the holders of the
participation certificates within thirty days thereafter. The agreement further
provided that the trustees might elect themselves directors and officers of the
corporation. At the time of the execution of the agreement, the by-laws of the
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RECENT DECISIONS

corporation provided for annual shareholders' meetings in March. In 1939,
defendant trustees, who had elected themselves directors and officers of the corporation, amended the by-laws to require the annual meetings to be held in
October of each year beginning with 1940. Plaintiff, holder of fourteen per cent
of the participation certificates, obtained an order restraining defendants "from
voting for, or electing, themselves •.. or other persons, as directors or officers
of the defendant corporation ... for any term •.. terminating beyond or later
than November 18, 1941." On appeal from this order, held, affirmed. Trustees
may not extend their control of property held in trust beyond the specified period
of the trust. Friedberg v. Schultz, 312 Ill. App. 171, 38 N. E. (2d) 182
(1941).
After considerable confusion and difficulty in Illinois on the subject,1 it has
been finally established that voting trusts for proper purposes are valid in that
state.2 The decision in the principal case is further evidence of the scepticism
with which the Illinois courts view the voting-trust arrangements. It is true that
the right to vote is one of the rights appertaining to ownership of stock, and therefore, the trustee would have a duty not to postpone the beneficiaries' enjoyment
of the right to vote for a period beyond that reasonably contemplated by the
trust agreement.3 However, it would seem that the parties contemplated management of corporate affairs by the trustee-elected directors for some period subsequent to the termination of the trust and distribution of stock. The agreement
expressly allowed the trustees thirty days after the termination of the trust in
which to distribute the stock to the beneficiaries. At least it must have been
intended that the trustee-elected directors would be competent to conduct the
affairs of the corporation until the situation was such that the new stockholders
could fairly elect new directors. The practical difficulties in distributing stock
to numerous anonymous trust certificate holders are well known; 4 and until
this distribution has been accomplished, there can be no determination of those
properly qualified to vote. Furthermore, at the time of the execution of the
trust agreement, the by-laws provided that elections should be held in March.
Hence, it would seem reasonable that the parties contemplated that the directors
elected by the trustees should manage the corporation until such meeting. The
effect of the decision in the principal case is to require an election of a new
board by the stockholders immediately upon termination of the trust, which
would require a distribution of stock to the voting trust certificate holders prior
to the termination of the trust, without regard to express or implied authority in
the trustees to elect directors to act for a reasonable time after termination of the
1
5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS, perm. ed., § 2080, p. 299 ( I 93 I) ;
Burke, "Voting Trusts Currently Observed," 24 MINN. L. REv. 347 at 352 (1940).
2
Boyle ¥. Smyth, 248 Ill. App. 57 at 82 (1928). See 3 UNiv. CHI. L. REv.
640 (1936) for a discussion of the development of the law of Illinois concerning the
validity of voting trusts.
3
Yet the duty to distribute the trust res on termination of the trust is qualified by
a right to take such time and steps as are reasonably necessary to protect the interest of
the beneficiaries and the trustee himself. 2 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 344, comments
a, e, f, § 345, comment e (1935).
4 See 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed., § 2094 ( 193 I);
CUSHING, VOTING TRUSTS 77-78 (1915).
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trust. 5 If there were a breach of trust in the principal case, it may have been in
amending the by-law_s to require the annual stockholders' meeting to be held in
October rather than March, for this would postpone the enjoyment of voting
rights by the beneficiaries seven months beyond the time which appears to
have been contemplated when the trust was created. 6 Still, even here, unless it
could be shown that this amendment was made with improper motives or in bad
faith or was not reasonable action in the interest of the beneficiaries, it could not
be deemed a breach of trust, 7 for the trust agreement empowered the trustees to
vote on, take part in and consent to any corporate or shareholders' action whatsoever. 8 The trustees' discretion in exercising these broad powers is limited only
by a duty to exercise them in the interest of the trust.9
Andrew J. Sawyer, Jr.

5 Plaintiff relied on an analogy to the rule that a trustee cannot lease trust pr-0perty
for a period extending beyond the termination of the trust. However, it seems clear
that a trustee may lease for such a term if the trust instrument confers the power to
do so, see "Raynolds v. Browning, King Co., 217 App. Div. 443, 217 N. Y. S. 15
(1926), affd. 245 N. Y. 623, 157 N. E. 884 (1927); 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS, § 189.3
(1939), dr if it be reasonably necessary for accomplishing the purposes of the trust.
See Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187 at 204, 145 A. 648 (1929). See note, 61 A. L.
R. 1368· (1929).
6 Neither plaintiff nor the court seems to have relied upon this as a breach. And
if it were a breach, it would hardly in and 9f itself justify the restraining order. Cf.
Hubbell v. Hubbell, 172 Iowa 538, 154 N. W. 867 (1915), holding that a lease for
a term exceeding the power of the trustee is good in equity for the term corresponding
with his power and void only as to the excess.
7 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS, § 187 (1939).
8 Brief for ,appellants, p. 4.
9 2 ScoTr, TRUSTS, §§ 193, 193.1, 193.2, 186, 170 (1939); 1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § J93 (1935). It is submitted that circumstances mjght prevail which
would justify postponing the exercise by the beneficiaries of their right to vote: e.g., if
there was danger that a militant minority might gain control of an election before complete distribution of stock to all could be accomplished; or if the state of affairs of the
corporation required the postponement in the interest of the trust.
The principal case seems to be the only one in which the power of voting trustees
to elect directors for a term extending beyond the termination pf the trust has been
litigated. CusHING, VOTING TRUSTS, rev. ed., 98 (1929), cites two instances· where
the trustees declined to exercise their voting right when termination of the trust was
pending and adjourned the annual meeting to afford the stockholders opportunity to
elect the board for the ensuing year after release of their certificates. Cf., in the earlier
edition of Mr. Cushing's book, the voting trust agreement of Chicago Great Western
R. R., CusHING, VOTING TRUSTS 145 (1915), providing that the trustees· may take
such steps as may be best adapted to enable the stockholders to elect the board at the
annual stockholders' meeting held next, after the termination of the voting 'trust, "or
as soon as may be practicable after the termination. ·•.."

